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the	 previous	 economic	 and	political	 order.	 The	mechanisms	






in	 place	 in	Hungary	 since	 1989.	 The	new	basic	 law	 includes	
some	necessary	solutions,	such	as	constitutional	restrictions	








of	 the	 investment	 climate,	 although	 the	 policy	 of	 support-
ing	selected	economic	sectors	has	prevented	capital	flight.	In	
turn,	the	drop	in	market	confidence	caused	temporary	prob-




•	 No	 fundamental	 change	of	direction	has	been	seen	 in	Euro-
pean	and	foreign	policy	and	Hungary	has	shown	little	activ-
ity	and	initiative	as	part	of	the	EU	and	NATO.	Relations	with	






















the	 Visegrad	 Group	 not	 as	 a	 format	which	 supplements	 the	
European	 integration	process	 and	which	 is	 a	 foundation	 for	
political	 coalitions	 inside	 the	European	Union,	but	rather	as	




gence	 in	 this	area.	On	 the	other	hand,	Fidesz	has	conducted	
a	much	more	active	policy	concerning	Hungarian	minorities	
abroad,	 and	 has	 thus	 caused	 tension	 in	 relations	 with	 the	
countries	it	borders.	





leading	 economic	 partner.	 Although	 Fidesz	 as	 an	 opposition	
party	had	severely	criticised	close	co-operation	with	Moscow	
in	energy	issues,	it	continued	the	political	left’s	policy	after	the	
election.	 Furthermore,	 Orban’s	 government	 decided	 to	 build	





































term,	 the	 coalition	government	 formed	by	Socialists	 and	Liber-
als	oversaw	a	rapid	increase	in	the	country’s	debt	and	a	crisis	in	
public	finances.	Furthermore,	Hungary	benefited	much	less	from	




























Fidesz	 capitalised	 on	 the	 disrepute	 of	 the	 political	 left,	 and	 to-
gether	with	KDNP	presented	 itself	as	 the	only	 legitimate	repre-
sentative	of	Hungarians.	Once	the	recording	discrediting	Prime	
Minister	 Gyurcsany	 had	 been	 disclosed,	 each	 time	 he	 spoke	 in	
parliament,	 the	 Fidesz-KDNP	 faction	would	 leave	 the	 chamber.	
During	 the	 referendum	 in	 2008	 initiated	 by	 Fidesz,	which	was	
a	plebiscite	against	 the	 left-wing	government,	citizens	voted	for	
the	 cancellation	 of	 charges	 for	 higher	 education,	 doctor’s	 visits	














Fidesz	 skilfully	 capitalised	 on	 growing	 frustration	 among	 the	
Hungarian	 public,	 who	 were	 tired	 of	 constant	 political	 scan-
dals	and	the	difficult	economic	situation1.	The	2010	election	also	
marked	 an	 end	 to	 the	 previously	 established	 set-up	 of	 political	
1	 In	the	survey	conducted	by	Pew	Research	Centre	in	2009,	94%	of	respond-
ents	 from	Hungary	 described	 the	 situation	 in	 their	 country	 as	 negative,	
while	 72%	of	 them	saw	 it	 as	being	worse	 than	 in	 the	 communist	 era.	 71%	
of	respondents	were	of	the	opinion	that	EU	membership	has	weakened	the	


























































“after	 forty-six	 years	 of	 occupation	 and	dictatorship	 and	 a	 cha-















































Centralist	 tendencies	 could	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 reforms	 carried	
out	by	the	Orban	government.	The	amendment	of	the	 local	gov-










lic	 of	 Hungary’	 (Magyar Köztársaság)	 was	 changed	 into	 simply	
‘Hungary’	(Magyarország).	This	was	intended	to	symbolise	a	clear	
break	with	 the	 legacy	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	Hungary.	Reg-


















of	 the	 same	 sex	were	 not	 repealed.	 The	 government	 party	was	
afraid	to	change	the	solutions	backed	by	a	significant	part	of	Hun-
garian	public3.	





purge	after	 its	victory	 in	2002	–	Fidesz	carried	 it	 out	on	a	 scale	
hitherto	unseen.	The	reasons	for	the	changes	included	the	need	
to	 call	 the	 incompetent	 left-wing	 government	 to	 account,	while	
the	act	that	facilitated	dismissing	public	administration	servants	
adopted	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	new	government’s	 term	proved	
































of	 regulatory	 institutions,	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	
judges	of	the	Constitutional	Court	and	other	senior	state	officials	
and	 this	 previously	meant	 that	 the	 candidates	were	 selected	 as	
a	 consequence	 of	 a	 compromise	 between	 the	 government	party	
and	the	opposition.	









verdicts	on	budget	 issues,	 and	vested	parliament	with	 the	right	
to	nominate	the	court’s	president	 (previously,	 the	court’s	 judges	
elected	one	of	their	number	to	be	the	presiding	 judge).	The	gov-
ernment	 camp	 has	 on	 many	 occasions	 actually	 challenged	 the	
ultimate	nature	of	 the	Constitutional	Court’s	decisions.	 In	some	
































tenures	of	many	 senior	officials	 and	nominated	 loyal	 adherents	
to	such	positions.	One	example	is	the	issue	of	media	supervision.	

























































to	him	 for	 signing.	He	did	not	use	his	 right	 to	 send	an	act	back	
to	parliament	to	be	considered	again	or	direct	it	to	the	Constitu-
tional	Court	even	once.	When	Schmitt	stepped	down	in	April	2012	
as	 a	 consequence	 of	 a	 plagiarism	 scandal,	 deputies	 from	Fidesz	
elected	Janos	Ader,	who	had	served	as	a	Member	of	the	European	













































































could	violate	European	 law	were	 loosened	under	pressure	 from	
the	European	Commission,	but	the	basic	part	of	the	act	remained	
in	 force.	However,	no	 gross	 violations	 of	 the	 freedom	of	 speech	
have	been	witnessed	over	the	past	few	years	(one	exception	could	








tisements	 in	Hungary’s	 largest	 dailies,	 Internet	 advertisements	
on	 the	 key	 news	 portals	 and	 on	 posters	 and	 hoardings.	 When	
speculation	about	the	terms	on	which	the	International	Monetary	
Fund	would	grant	a	loan	to	Hungary	appeared	in	the	media	in	Oc-






























slogan	“Hungary	is	better-off”	(Magyarország jobban teljesít) in	the	



























lion	 euros	 granted	 by	 the	 IMF	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions.	












































It	was	assumed	 in	Fidesz’s	economic	strategy	that	 the	 income	
tax	 cuts	 for	 individuals	 and	 small	 and	medium-sized	 compa-
nies	would	 revive	 the	 stagnant	Hungarian	 economy.	 In	 turn,	
the	special	taxes	imposed	on	some	sectors	and	the	return	to	the	
state-controlled	pension	system	were	expected	to	significantly	
improve	 the	 country’s	 fiscal	 situation.	 However,	 the	 govern-
ment’s	plans	had	to	face	domestic	and	foreign	restrictions.	The	






1. The fiscal policy
In	 the	first	year	of	 its	 rule,	Fidesz	cut	 the	 income	 tax	and	was	
simultaneously	 searching	 for	new	 sources	 of	 budget	 revenues.	
A	16%	flat-rate	personal	income	tax	was	introduced	in	2011,	re-
placing	the	previous	system	where	two	thresholds	(18%	and	36%)	
applied.	The	 16%	corporate	 income	 tax	 (CIT)	 rate	was	 replaced	
with	two	rates:	19%	and	the	reduced	10%	rate	for	firms	with	in-
comes	lower	than	500	million	forints	(around	1.6	million	euros).	
Lower	budget	 incomes	were	 to	be	 compensated	by	 crisis	 taxes	
imposed	on	banks,	insurance	companies,	energy	companies,	tel-
ecommunication	service	providers	and	retail	chains.	In	Febru-


























had	 predicted	 economic	 growth	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 3-5%	 in	 2011-201310,	
Hungary’s	 economy	 once	more	 entered	 recession	 (-1.7%	GDP)	 in	
2012.	In	addition	to	this,	the	financial	crisis	in	the	eurozone	wors-












ited	 extent.	 Between	 2011	 and	 2013,	 parliament	 adopted	 a	 total	
of	eleven	law	packages	aimed	at	stabilising	the	budget	situation.	
The	VAT	rate	was	lifted	from	25	to	27%	(being	the	highest	in	the	


























stricted.	 Furthermore,	 expenses	 on	 higher	 education,	 subsidies	































































been	 treated	on	preferential	 terms.	The	government	has	 signed	
a	number	of	strategic	co-operation	agreements	with	corporations	
from	this	sector.	These	agreements	were	intended	to	strengthen	


























economy.	 These	were	 predominantly	 solutions	which	 burdened	
the	private	sector.	In	2011,	borrowers	received	the	option	to	make	
a	 single	 repayment	 of	 mortgage	 loans	 in	 foreign	 currencies	 at	








the	 energy	price	 reduction	has	become	 the	 leitmotiv	 in	Fidesz’s	
campaign	ahead	of	the	election	in	April	2014.
3. The results 
Maintaining	 financial	 discipline	 and	 reducing	 the	 level	 of	 the	
budget	deficit	to	below	3%	are	the	government’s	greatest	achieve-
ments.	The	 imposition	of	 a	 constitutional	 limit	 (50%	of	GDP)	on	
public	debt	was	also	a	positive	move	Fidesz	made.	If	the	debt	ex-



























a	boost,	 but	 this	 has	 been	 sated	primarily	with	 imported	prod-




adversely	 affected	 the	 investment	 climate.	 Although	 no	 major	
outflow	of	investments	from	Hungary	has	been	seen,	the	oppor-
tunities	to	attract	new	investors	have	been	significantly	reduced.	







towards	 the	 end	 of	 201314.	 Emigration	 from	Hungary	mostly	 to	
Germany	has	increased	significantly	over	the	past	few	years.	The	
















































































































































III. EUROPEAN AND FOREIGN POLICY
The	 government	 led	 by	 Orban	 has	 not	 made	 any	 fundamental	












The	 Fidesz	 government	 has	 demonstrated	 a	 greater	 interest	 in	
regional	 co-operation,	 especially	 as	part	of	 the	Visegrad	Group.	
However,	 its	 policy	 towards Hungarian	minorities	 in	 the	 coun-

















































































cil	of	 the	EU	 in	 the	first	half	of	2011	and	negotiations	of	 the	EU’s	
multiannual	 financial	 framework	 for	 2014-2020.	 The	 Hungarian	
diplomacy	effectively	directed	the	work	of	 the	Council	of	 the	EU.	
A	significant	part	of	priorities	which	had	been	previously	set	were	
implemented,	 including	 the	 accession	 treaty	 with	 Croatia	 being	















2. The international criticism
Hungary’s	 relations	with	 its	Western	 partners	 have	 cooled	 sig-
nificantly.	Fidesz	has	been	criticised	for	 ‘abusing’	 its	 two-thirds	
majority	 in	 parliament	 and	 an	 excessive	 concentration	 of	 pow-



































eration	 in	 evaluating	 the	Hungarian	government	 and	 support	 in	
view	of	disproportionately	strong	criticism	have	been	manifested	
especially	by	Hungary’s	partners	from	the	Visegrad	Group.	
Budapest	 has	 relinquished	 part	 of	 the	 planned	 changes	 or	 re-
pealed	the	most	controversial	regulations	under	foreign	pressure.	
As	a	rule,	 it	made	 limited	concessions	when	other	countries	 in-
sisted	on	 them.	Budapest	was	willing	 to	 cancel	especially	 those	
changes	 in	 the	 case	 of	which	 the	 European	 Commission	would	
launch	the	EU	infringement	procedure,	which	could	have	ended	





























standards	of	 the	European	 rule	of	 law	and	has	protested	against	















come	 to	 those	 holding	 liberal	 and	 leftist	 views.	 They	 presented	































3. The policy on Central Europe
Given	the	sharp	disputes	with	European	institutions,	the	Hungar-





ber	 states.	Although	Hungary’s	 approach	was	not	 backed	by	 its	
partners,	the	country	became	engaged	in	co-operation	as	part	of	



































a	significantly	more	 important	role	 in	 foreign	policy	 than	 it	did	
under	 Socialist	 rule.	 The	 level	 of	 financial	 support	 for	 the	mi-
norities	has	been	slightly	increased.	Furthermore,	Budapest	has	
become	more	engaged	in	the	political	 life	of	Hungarian	commu-
nities.	 The	 Orban	 government	 has	 offered	 selective	 support	 to	
Hungarian	parties	in	the	neighbouring	countries,	backing	those	
which	 insist	more	 strongly	 on	 being	 given	 autonomy,	 standing	




























































power,	 a	 rapprochement	 between	 Hungary	 and	 Romania	 took	
place,	and	was	additionally	cemented	by	good	relations	between	
Prime	Minister	Orban	and	President	Traian	Basescu.	Romania’s	
centre-right	government	was	able	 to	 sympathise	with	 the	Hun-
garian	 citizenship	 act,	 partly	 because	 the	 country	 had	 adopted	
similar	solutions	with	regard	to	citizens	of	Moldova	and	Ukraine.	
However,	 the	 opposition	 criticised	 the	 presidential	 camp	 for	
concessions	 towards	 Hungary.	 This	 led	 to	 tension	 between	 the	
















Budapest’s	 support	 for	 the	Hungarian	minority’s	aspirations	 for	








The	 rights	 of	 Hungarian	 minorities	 became	 the	 main	 issue	 in	
Hungary’s	 relations	with	Ukraine	 (around	 150,000	 ethnic	Hun-
garians	 live	 in	 Zakarpattia	 Oblast).	 Since	 the	 commencement	
of	the	protests	on	the	Maidan	in	November	2013,	reactions	from	
Hungary	 were	 limited	 to	 official	 statements	 condemning	 vio-
lence.	 Hungary	 supported	 Kyiv’s	 European	 aspirations,	 but	 its	















4. The Eastern opening
The	 Orban	 government	 granted	 high	 political	 significance	 to	





































































after	 the	 election.	 Firm	 support	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 South	
Stream	was	upheld,	and	 the	Orban	government	was	 the	first	 to	
withdraw	its	support	for	the	rival	Nabucco	gas	pipeline	project.	
The	government	also	decided	to	entrust	Russia’s	state-controlled	
company	Rosatom	with	 implementing	Hungary’s	 largest	 invest-
ment	 since	 1989,	without	 holding	 a	 tender.	 In	 January	 2014,	 an	
agreement	 envisaging	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 reactors	 for	 the	
Paks	nuclear	power	plant	was	 signed	 in	Moscow,	and	a	 30-year	
loan	of	around	10	billion	euros	is	expected	to	be	granted	by	Rus-
sian	banks.	Energy	co-operation	has	been	accompanied	by	the	es-







sia,	 although	 he	 had	 demonstrated	 a	 sceptical	 attitude	 towards	
Russia	for	years,	and	the	memory	of	the	1956	uprising	suppressed	
by	Soviet	troops	had	been	an	essential	element	of	Fidesz’s	identity.	
The	 political	 rapprochement	with	 Russia	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 the	 de-
sire	to	find	a	comprehensive	solution	to	the	challenges	which	the	
Hungarian	energy	sector	has	been	facing,	and	of	the	wish	to	treat	
22	 Closer	 co-operation	with	 Russia	 has	 also	 extended	 to	 establishing	 closer	






































































mum	wage,	which	has	been	an	 important	gesture	 for	 those	on	
lower	incomes.	Despite	the	dire	straits	faced	by	public	finances,	
pension	 indexations	were	 carried	 out	 every	 year.	 This	 has	 al-






























consolidate	 its	 electorate	 using	 slogans	 about	 defending	 the	
country’s	 sovereignty.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 able	 to	 maintain	 high	
support	 levels	through	a	constant	mobilisation	of	its	electorate	
manifested	for	example	by	marches	of	support	 for	 the	govern-
ment	 (so-called	 “peace	marches”),	 signature	 collecting	 actions	
to	 support	Fidesz’s	projects,	 letters	 sent	by	 the	prime	minister	











put	 forward	 joint	 candidates	 in	 single-member	 constituencies,	
to	 thus	 increase	 their	 chances	 for	 success.	However,	 the	pres-





proposals	 and	 has	 strongly	 emphasised	 national	 and	 historic	
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